share of the budget in the form of subsidies.
48
To determine whether the nature of bargaining and coalition formation within commit- a coalition with other user representatives, to make sure his proposal will be accepted. A general case of a water board (or river basin committee) with water user representatives. We
Basic Setting

135
We assume there are n committee members (also referred to as "players"), from which k 136 are representatives of water user categories, i = 1, . . . , k, with k ≤ n. Non-water users, 137 j = k + 1, . . . , n, are stakeholders not directly impacted by committee decisions on budget.
138
We denote by γ i the fraction of total taxes paid by the ith category of users:
where t i is the amount of taxes paid by the ith category of users. We assume, without 140 loss of generality, that γ 1 ≤ γ 2 ≤ · · · ≤ γ k .
141
The committee members decide on the distribution of the budget, normalized to 1 without 142 loss of generality, among the k users. The policy space is X ≡ x ∈ R k + :
where x i denotes the budget share for user i. Water user representatives are assumed to be 144 concerned exclusively by their own budget share. In contrast, preferences of other (non-user) 145 committee members can possibly concern the welfare of all k categories of users. We assume 146 that each player j = k + 1, . . . , n assigns a weight β ij to user category i, i = 1...k, such that 147 for any j = k + 1, . . . , n and i = 1, . . . , k, β ij ∈ [0, 1] and k i=1 β ij = 1. Then, given the 148 vector of shares x = (x 1 , ..., x k ) the utility of player j, j = k + 1, . . . , n, is
where u i is a twice continuously differentiable function such that u i > 0 and u i < 0. We 150 refer to the case where all vectors β j = (β 1j , . . . , β kj ), j = 1, . . . , n have their coordinates 151 equal to 0 except one as the corner regime.
152
Players act both as voters and as proposers. The voting activity is described by a weighted 153 majority game. Let q i denote the voting weight (the number of representatives) of category i.
154
We assume that all other voters have weight equal to 1. The quota Q of the game could be any unanimity is required. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that Q is the majority quota.
159
We denote by W (W m ) the set of winning (minimal winning) coalitions.
The distribution of proposal powers is represented by the vector p = (p 1 , p 2 , ..., p n ) such 161 that p i ≥ 0 for all i = 1, ..., n, and n i=1 p i = 1, where p i denotes the probability that player 162 i is in charge of making a proposal.
163
The game has two stages. The first stage is a BD bargaining game on the fraction, 164 denoted α, of the budget distributed proportionally to tax payments. This is a sequential 165 game with a possibly infinite number of rounds. At each round t, a proposer i(t) is selected 166 and makes a proposal α(i, t), which members of the committee may approve or reject. If the 167 subset of members approving the proposal is a winning coalition, the proposal is adopted, 168 and if not, the game moves to round t + 1 and the procedure is repeated. If the procedure 169 fails, γ is adopted.
170
If α = 1 is selected, the game ends after the first stage and the whole budget is distributed to make a proposal x(i) ∈ X which can be accepted or not by other players. If the subset of 176 players approving the proposal is a winning coalition, it is adopted, otherwise, the vector γ 177 is adopted for the residual budget.
178
We solve this sequential game backwards, and in the following subsection we proceed 179 with the description of the second stage of the game.
180
3 A coalition S is a winning one if and only if i∈S q i ≥ Q. If, moreover, by dropping any player j we reverse the inequality, i.e., i∈S\{j} q i < Q for any j ∈ S, then such a coalition S is called minimal winning.
Second Stage: Distribution of Residual Budget
The outcome of the second stage is the allocation of residual budget (1 − α) among categories 182 of users. Nature draws proposer j with probability p j ≥ 0, where n j=1 p j = 1.
183
Proposer j selects vector x j = {x 1j , x 2j , . . . ,
. 4 We 184 denote by S α such simplex. If a majority of members votes in favor of the proposal, the 185 proposal is adopted. Otherwise, the proposal is defeated and the default option γ is used to 186 allocate the residual fraction of the budget. In what follows we describe the voting response.
187
Voter l votes for the proposal x j if and only if
We assume that ties are broken in favor of the proposer.
189
For the proposal to be accepted, the proposer should consider the cost of "buying" a 190 minimal winning coalition. Letting S be any such coalition, the problem of proposer j can 191 be written as:
Let us denote by C(α, S, j) the value of this problem and
We also denote by x * j (α) for j = 1...n the optimal solution to problem (4) and we proceed 194 as if this solution were unique.
195
Let us look at the solution for the corner regime under complete information. In such 196 a case, each player j, j = k + 1, ..., n acts in favour of a single user group.
denote the group (the number) of representatives in the set {k + 1, ..., n} acting for user i,
198
we have
In such a case, players voting on behalf of category i have weight equal to w i = q i + m i .
200
Further, the set of supporters of category i votes in favor of the proposal if and only if
Things are as if proposer j representing category i makes a proposal to win the votes of a 202 winning coalition in a weighted majority game with {1, 2, ..., k} as the set of players and w i 203 being the weight of player i. The probability of player i to be selected as a proposer is now 204 equal to:
The set of (minimal) winning coalitions of this simple game is denoted by ( W m ) W.
206
We have,
and therefore,
Equivalently in this case:
To obtain a closed-form expression for x * ij (voter i's equilibrium share when j is the lottery where he receives a prize equal to x * ij (α) with probability p j .
218
The expected utility V i (α) of player i is equal to:
Note that when j = i, player i's equilibrium share x * ij is either equal to 0 or to (1 − α) γ i . The player's expected utility is therefore based on two numbers: first, the probability denoted by P i that i is considered in the continuation game when i is not the proposer himself, and second, the coalition S i of players who receive a positive share in his proposal. Without loss of generality, we assume that S i does not contain player i. Player i's share x i can be expressed as:
with probability p i , γ i with probability P i , αγ i with probability 1 − p i − P i . We obtain that:
From our assumptions on u i , it follows that V i (α) < 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1], i.e., func- The following proposition summarizes the properties displayed by the preferred peaks of 227 the different groups. 
Moreover, there exist threshold values γ i and γ i such that 0 ≤ γ i < γ i and:
232
5 This result implies that if n is odd, then the equilibrium is unique. However, if n is even, there is no single middle value, and the median is then can be defined as the mean of the two middle values.
has a unique maximum on the interval (0, 1) and it is defined 234 from the equation
is increasing on the whole interval [0, 1].
236
The thresholds γ i and γ i are calculated as:
and
Proof: see Appendix 1. i.e., γ i . Being a "cheap" coalitional partner, he is included in any coalition when he is not a
244
proposer receiving an offer equal to γ i . When he is a proposer he gets strictly more than γ i .
245
On the contrary, part (iii) of the proposition states that any player i with relatively high 246 γ i , i.e., with γ i above γ i , prefers to share the whole budget according to the mechanical 247 rule as his preferred α * i = 1. The reason is that in the bargaining game, player i being an
248
"expensive" coalitional partner receives no offer when he is not a proposer. An interesting feature of our model is that it includes as special cases the absence of bar-334 gaining (equivalent to α = 1) and bargaining over the full budget (when α = 0). Therefore, 335 these two polar cases can be considered equivalent to a situation in which the outcome of 336 the bargaining game corresponds to a one-stage game.
337
6 In our setting, a difference is that the disagreement payoffs correspond to the relative amount of taxes paid. reasonably be grouped into three major categories (local communities, industry, agriculture).
Data
397
Consider then the case k = 3 and the simple majority game. From data presentation above, we let γ 1 < γ 2 < γ 3 , with player 1 corresponding to agriculture, player 2 to industry, and player 3 to residential users. As before, we denote by x i share of group i from the bargaining game. Since player 1 is the "cheapest", he is always in the winning coalition, therefore his share is:
, with probability p 1 , γ 1 , with probability 1 − p 1 .
Consider then player 2. It is included in the winning coalition by group 1 but not by group 3:
, with probability p 2 , γ 2 , with probability p 1 , αγ 2 , with probability p 3 .
Since player 3 is the "most expensive", it is invited as a coalition partner by neither group 1 nor group 2:
) with probability p 3 , αγ 3 with probability 1 − p 3 .
From the assumption on u 1 it follows that V 1 (α) < 0 and therefore, α * 1 = 0.
398
Results are summarized in Figure 1 , and details are provided in Appendix 2. 
first-order conditions (25) and (26) (see Appendix 2) can be solved explicitly for α * 2 and α * 3 :
Interestingly, since for CRRA utility functions u i (0) = ∞, the two extreme cases with 405 α * = 0 (see Figure 1 ) disappear, i.e., at equilibrium a positive part of the budget is al-
406
ways shared according to the mechanical rule. We assume from now on that risk aversion 407 parameters ρ are constant over time.
408
The system of budget share equations can be written, for water user category i, river 409 basin j and time period t:
where
From Equation (18), it can be seen that for any value of α * , user category 1 (agriculture) 413 always gains from bargaining because x 1jt − γ 1jt ≥ 0.
414
The structural model of bargaining consists of the system of non linear equations for subsidy shares, with probabilities p ijt , tax shares γ ijt and risk-aversion parameter ρ ij on the right-hand side. Because probabilities (that a representative of category j is a proposer) are not observed and correspond to the subsidy internal committee, we assume that they are related to observed political representation of water users in the RBCs. More precisely, we specify a logit probability:
p ijt = P rob(user i from river basin j at time t is the proposer)
where, without loss of generality, category 1 is chosen as the reference.
416
The optimal parameter α * in river basin j at time t equals α * 2 ifp 3 /p 2 < γ 3 /γ 2 , equals α 
445
To avoid possible small-sample bias because of excessive over-identification, we consider 446 only two instruments for each equation, which yields two over-identifying moment restrictions
447
(5 moment conditions for 3 parameters).The variance-covariance matrix of parameter esti-
448
mates is computed with a heteroskedasticity-consistent robust procedure, using river basin 449 as a cluster variable to construct such matrix. 
Estimation results
451
We consider several specifications of the structural model, to check for robustness along full or no bargaining is strongly rejected, when α * is evaluated at the sample mean.
469
[ We compare our GMM structural parameter estimates with reduced-form estimates. To allocations are determined by a principle of solidarity which can be evaluated in several ways.
480
Given that the bulk of budget spending is devoted to agriculture and less-favoured regions, Agencies, and also the fact that subsidies aim at helping water users reduce their tax burden 498 paid to water Agencies. We therefore consider only W and γ as explanatory variables. This 499 also has the advantage of matching exactly variables used in the structural model.
500
We perform a regression analysis of the relative subsidies received by two out of the three 501 main water users (agriculture and industry, because these shares sum to 1), as a function of 502 relative representation in RBC and/or tax shares of each user category.
503
The system of reduced-form equations is the following: 
514
Because a significant proportion of RBC members are not likely to have a significant role 515 in the discussions over the distribution of subsidies, we consider only the proportion of (agri-516 culture, industry) representatives with respect to the total number of user representatives in 517 the RBC, which corresponds to specification (F) of the structural model.
518 Table 3 presents estimation results by GMM of the reduced-form model, with two spe- and W 2 are significant in three cases out of four.
528
Regarding goodness of fit, our structural model with the same number of parameters
529
(β 2 , β 3 and ρ) as Model I has a slightly lower coefficient R 2 than Model I or Model III. in Table 3 indicate that models are observationally equivalent at the 5 percent level, and that 541 the structural model would be preferred to reduced-form Model III at the 10 percent level.
542
We therefore conclude that our structural model performs well in predicting relative subsidy shares, with a limited number of parameters and restrictions on the relationship between x 544 and W imposed by the bargaining model.
545
[ The bargaining model presented in this paper draws upon Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and user representation and the probability to be selected as a proposer of a budget distribution.
576
We perform a structural estimation of the bargaining model under assumptions regarding 577 players' preferences, the distribution of representative power over water users, and the struc- bargaining is taking place, is also rejected.
584
Our results can be used to provide a better understanding of the nature of negotiation 585 processes in water boards and its expected impact on budget distribution issues. In particu- would increase as a result, this is not enough to modify the outcome of coalition formation.
599
Our bargaining model provides a simplified representation of negotiation over budget in 600 river basin committees, with reasonable performance given data limitations. Deeper investi-601 gation into coalition formation and bargaining in committees, using detailed proceedings of 602 committee meetings for a given river basin, is a possible extension of the present analysis.
603
In addition, other environmental or land planning policies could be considered, when a sim- 
607
Taking derivatives of V with respect to α one gets:
Since u i (·) < 0 it follows from (24) that V i (α) ≤ 0.
610
From (23) it follows that:
the function V i (1) ≥ 0, and for γ i ≤ γ i the opposite 611 inequality holds true.
612
The derivative of V at α = 0 is:
One can check that: V i (0) ≤ 0 if and only if γ i ≤ γ i , where γ i satisfies (14).
Since u i ≤ 0 we can deduce that u i (0) ≥ u i j∈N \S i γ j . Substituting this into (14) we 615 prove that γ i ≤ γ i .
616
Summing up, for 0 ≤ γ i ≤ γ i the function V i (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1], 617 for γ i ≥ γ i it is increasing on the whole interval, and for γ < γ i < γ i it has unique maximum 618 on the interval [0, 1].
Therefore, the behavior of player 2 can be described as follows:
, function V 2 (α) increases on the whole interval [0, 1] and therefore α * 2 = 1;
which is defined from the equality V 2 (α) = 0, that is,
, function V 2 (α) is decreasing on the whole interval [0, 1] and 627 therefore α * 2 = 0.
628
In a similar way, the thresholds on the tax share for player 3 can be expressed as follows:
The behavior of player 3 can be summarized as: 
, function V 3 (α) has an inferior maximum α * 3 on
633
[0, 1] and it is defined from V 3 (α) = 0: Estimation method: nonlinear two-step GMM. Standard errors in parentheses are estimated from a heteroskedasticity-consistent robust variance-covariance matrix.*, ** and *** respectively denote parameter significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Parameter α is estimated in a second stage from GMM estimates, and at the sample mean. Standard errors (in parentheses) are estimated from a heteroskedasticity-consistent robust variance-covariance matrix.*, ** and *** respectively denote parameter significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Instruments for Model I and Model II equations: (1, γ 1 , γ 2 , w 2 ).
Instruments for Model III equations : (γ 1 , w 2 , γ 2 , w 1 , w 1 × γ 2 , γ 1 × γ 2 ). τ statistic is the non-nested test statistic for H 0 : M S = M R , with p-value in parentheses (M S and M R are structural and reduced-form models respectively). 
